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This work seeks to study, through a software-based network test-bed, the impact of 
utilizing various feedback information and defensive strategies on the survivability of 
Real Time Network-based Intrusion Detection System (RT-IDS) under overload 
attacks.  
 
 First of all, a general introduction for Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is given; 
different categories of both the intrusions and the IDSs are stated. The key elements 
and internal structure of RT-IDS, which is the research focus of this work, are 
naturally followed. Among them, the aspect about survivability of RT-IDS is 
highlighted, called for further investigation.  
 
After browsing the research field of this thesis, an optimization and control problem 
about RT-IDS is presented. Its definition and preliminaries are presented in detail. The 
mechanism of the so called adaptive RT-IDS under overload attack is formulated as an 
optimization problem with Knapsack Constraint. Then, disadvantages in the defensive 
strategy of this model are pointed out. A plan to enhance the survivability of RT-IDS 
by studying the relationship between timing of Knapsack Algorithm execution and 
performance of RT-IDS is proposed. 
 
Afterward, we present the network test-bed used in the simulation. The simulation 
architecture of the software-based network test-bed is carefully illustrated, including 
both the traffic generating module and the traffic receiving module. To simplify the 
  
vi
simulation and make the test-bed reliable, many practical considerations of simulation 
are given and explained in detail. 
 
After that, we will show the simulation results and analysis of simulation data. The 
graphics about network volume and packet loss of RT-IDS utilizing different feedback 
information and defensive strategies are shown. Through studying the statistical 
information of the RT-IDSs, we find that different defensive strategies do affect the 
performance of RT-IDS a lot. Moreover, strategies referring to more feedback 
information perform better than that refers to only the incoming traffic volume. Then, a 
study about the phenomena of periodically packets loss is given, providing a 
complementary viewpoint of the internal mechanism of adaptive RT-IDS. 
 
Finally, a conclusion of the whole thesis is presented and the direction of future 
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1.1 Introduction of Intrusion Detection Systems 
Network security has become a critical issue since computers have been networked 
together. The evolution of the internet has increased the need for security systems and 
this has led to the search for the best ways possible to protect information systems. The 
term security, according to Saltzer and Schroeder (1975), is used to denote techniques 
and mechanisms that decide who has the right to modify or utilize the information 
system, or the information stored in it. Given the explosive expansion of the Internet 
and the increased availability of network attacking tools, Intrusion Detection becomes 
a critical component of network security defense system. Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs) are the ‘watchdogs’ of the information systems (Axelsson, 2000b). The goal of 
Intrusion Detection is to discover attacks in a computer or network, by inspecting 
various network activities, traffics or attributes. Here the term “attacks” refers to any 
set of improper actions that threaten the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a 
network resource. 
 
We first look deep into the cause that inspires the appearance of IDS, i.e. the network 
intrusions or attacks. It should be noted that network intrusion can be one of a number 
of different types. Researchers of early stage (Neumann and Parker, 1989; Lindqvist 
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and Jonsson, 1997) focus more on a high level of representation that aims to apply to 
the specific problems in hand. Axelsson et al (1998) propose a methodology about 
what to trace in information systems. They connect the classification of various 
computer intrusions to the problem of detection, through studying UNIX security 
logging. 
 
In DARPA sponsored Intrusion Detection evaluations (Lippmann et al, 2000), starting 
form 1998, a taxonomy of network intrusion was introduced, which has been cited in 
many subsequent works. Under this taxonomy, intrusions fall into four main categories: 
 
1. DOS (Denial of Service): intrusions are designed to make a host or network 
service unavailable, e.g. SYN flooding (Northcutt and Novak, 2002). 
2. Probing: these intrusions include many programs that can scan a network or hosts 
automatically to gather information, or to find known vulnerabilities, e.g., port 
scanning. 
3. U2R (User to Root): intrusions correspond to a local user on a machine becoming 
able to obtain privileges normally reserved for the system administrator or super 
user, e.g., various “buffer overflow” attacks. 
4. R2L (Remote to Local): intrusions correspond to an attacker who does not own 
access on a victim computer, sends packets to that machine and gains local 
account, e.g., guessing password. 
 
After introducing the categories of intrusion, we move to the origin and development 
of Intrusion Detection System itself. Due to the inadequacy of protection mechanisms 
for information system, IDS developed at a fast speed in the past twenty five years. 
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Among those achievements in this field, works of Anderson (1980) and Denning (1987) 
have highly influential impact, constituting a basis for further. Generally speaking, an 
Intrusion Detection System consists of a data collection part which gathers the 
information about the system being monitored, and a data processing part which 
analyses the collected data by pre-implemented detection principle to find out 
embedded intrusions. Researchers (Helman and Liepins, 1993; Axelsson et al, 1998; 
Lane and Brodie, 1998) have studied the problem of what kind of data should be 
gathered by the collection part, though from different points of view. As the crucial 
component of IDS, the data processing part may be designed in a multiple way, 
employing distinct decision principles. We can find plenty of solutions and 
implementations in the literature of, to serve as examples, Heberlein et al (1990), 
Habra et al (1992), Anderson et al (1995), White and Pooch (1996), and Lindqvist and 
Phillip (1999). 
 
At the early stage of information assurance (Allen et al, 2000), people pay great effort 
to the prevention of attacks, e.g. Saltzer and Schroeder (1975). Recently, more and 
more network administrators realize that prevention alone is not comprehensive 
enough to protect complex information systems. Schneider (1998) proposed a 
Defense-in-Depth model that combines different defensive mechanisms into one 
security architecture. Later researchers and software designers consider adding 
“Detection and Response” into the mechanism of network security, e.g. Northcutt 
(1999). It is pointed out by Allen et al (2000) and Kent (2000) that this add-on can 
definitely build securer defense systems when effective preventive methods are absent. 
So, current IDSs are often implemented together with other protection mechanisms of 
information systems, like VPN (Virtual Private Networks), firewalls and smart cards 
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(Kent, 2000). Other researchers (Ryutov et al, 2003) apply dynamic authorization 
techniques to support fine-grained access control and application level intrusion 
detection and response capabilities. 
 
Like the intrusions, there are also different categories in Intrusion Detection Systems. 
We introduce three popular classification methods for current IDS here. The first one 
is according to the detection principles that implemented by the IDS. The second one 
is based on the data source from which the data collection part gathers information for 
analyzing. The third one is based on the timeliness of detection. 
 
There are two categories under the first classification method: misuse detection and 
anomaly detection. Misuse detection finds intrusions on the basis of known knowledge 
of intrusion model. This is the category employed by the current generation of 
commercial Intrusion Detection Systems. Misuse detection involves the monitoring of 
network traffic in search of direct matches to known patterns of attack (called 
signatures). So, it is essentially a rule-based principle. A shortcoming of this principle 
is that it can not detect intrusions that are previously unknown. Many famous IDSs are 
misuse detection systems, such as Snort (Roesch, 1999). On the other side, anomaly 
detection defines the expected behavior (or profile) of the monitored system in 
advance. Any large deviation from this expected behavior is reported as possible attack. 
The primary advantage of anomaly detection is the ability to detect novel attacks for 
which signatures have not been defined. The disadvantage is the high false alarm rate. 
 
For the second classification method of Intrusion Detection Systems, two general 
categories are host-based detection and network-based detection. In host-based 
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intrusion detection, IDSs directly monitor the host data files and operating system 
processes that will potentially be targets of attack. They can, therefore, determine 
exactly which host resources are the targets of a particular attack. For network-based 
intrusion detection, the data, usually TCP/IP packets, is read directly from the 
communication medium, such as Ethernet. The collected data corresponds to the 
aggregated traffic coming in and out between the monitored network and outside 
networks, e.g. the Internet. Hence, compared with host-based IDS, network-based IDS 
has the potential to watch the security status of the network from a much broader sight, 
being able to detect larger classes of intrusions. Moreover, such IDSs perform only the 
“sniff” behavior, so that they are usually “invisible” for the attackers. 
 
Under the third method of classification, Intrusion Detection Systems can be divided 
into two groups: real time IDS and off-line IDS. Real time IDSs attempt to detect and 
respond to attacks while they are unfolding. Off-line IDSs, on the other hand, process 
audit data with some delay, which in turn delays the time of detection. Aiming at 
searching for more accurate detection rules, the problem of off-line IDS is about 
classification and decision theory. For real time IDS, it is expected that timeliness 
constraints are included (Cabrera and Mehra, 2002). 
 
There also exist other classification methods for IDS (Noel, 2002), but they are not as 
relevant to this thesis as previous three. The IDS that we are studying in our research is 
a real time network-based Intrusion Detection System, implementing misuse detection 
principle. 
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1.2 Key Elements of Real Time Network-based IDS 
Figure 1.1 taken from Paxson (1999) shows the main elements of a real time, network-
based IDS (RT-IDS). We can see in the figure that each packet entered the information 
system is duplicated into the RT-IDS. In RT-IDS, raw data (the packets) is 
transformed into events (semantically higher level of representation of raw data) for 
analysis. Then, these events will be forwarded to a Computing Engine that processes 
rules for detecting the existence of intrusions in the events. The Computing Engine 
will issue a statement for each event, either intrusion or non-intrusion. In the former 










Figure 1.1: Real Time Network-based Intrusion Detection System 
 
There are two categories in RT-IDS, depending on complexity of the Event Engine. 
They are stateless (or packet driven) RT-IDS and state-full (or event driven) RT-IDS. 
In stateless RT-IDS, such as Snort (Roesch, 1999), the packets are forwarded to the 
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individual packet, i.e. the information contained in the header and body of packet. So, 
strictly speaking, stateless RT-IDS only has the Computing Engine.  
 
In the case of state-full RT-IDS, such as Bro (Paxson, 1999), events represent the data 
in a semantically higher level. Instead of being fed into the Computing Engine directly, 
raw packets corresponding to each session are re-assembled online, providing a 
snapshot of the TCP session as it progresses. Typical events are Telnet, HTTP, FTP, 
etc. The Computing Engine applies rules on events, and labels these events as normal 
or intrusions. As shown in Figure 1.1, the RT-IDS also performs other two functions: 
(1) it forwards meaningful events for storage, and possible off-line analysis by human 
operators, and (2) it forwards the RT-IDS statements to another component of the 
information system, responsible for responding to the attack.  
 
There are several key elements associated with the design of RT-IDS (Cabrera and 
Mehra, 2002): (1) Accuracy: The RT-IDS should produce accurate statements (low 
rates of false alarms and missed detections); (2) Limited processing resources: 
Operation must remain within bounds of real time memory and CPU power; (3) 
Timeliness: The RT-IDS should issue its statements in a timely manner; (4) Threat 
differentiation: If limited resources are available, the RT-IDS should give priority to 
more critical intrusions over lesser threats; (5) Sensitivity to the environment: The IDS 
should be sensitive to changes in the operating environment. (6) Survivability: It is 
desirable that the IDS has the ability to withstand hostile attack against the IDS itself. 
The RT-IDS should be capable to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner even in the 
presence of attacks, failures and accidents. 
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Many researchers of IDS have focused their interests on Accuracy, which is the most 
important issue when systems are designed for off-line detection. The rule sets of these 
IDSs are statically configured, since there is not any resource constrains. However, in 
real time IDS, when timeliness and bounds in processing resources are present, 
accuracy may need to be sacrificed in order to reach a balance among different design 
specifications in RT-IDS, especially the survivability. To solve this issue, the exact 
nature of the relationship between intrusions and network security deserves a thorough 
examination. Cabrera and Mehra (2002) summarize a hierarchy of problem in IDS by 
control and estimation methods, providing a guideline to treat the IDS problem from a 
System and Control point of view. 
 
 
1.3 Control and Estimation Methods in Intrusion Detection Systems 
Control and estimation methods have been applied in the field of information systems 
broadly, like those in congestion control and routing (Walrand and Varaiya, 1996; Low 
et al, 2002). However, little work has put the emphasis on network security. 
Traditional approach was to regard the problem brought by attacks against information 
system as Fault Management. Recently, however, researchers realize that the inbeing 
between intrusion and the IDS requires re-evaluation. Levitt and Cheung (1994) 
pointed out that the threat to security is usually a human, or a process (or program) that 
traces its ancestry to a human. Thus, the security threat can adjust itself so as to thwart 
the defenses launched against it. This viewpoint generates a serial of problems that can 
be solved using control theories. Quite a few techniques of control community have 
been used, such as Game Theory (Alpcan and Basar, 2003), Neural Networks (Zhang 
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et al, 2001; Jiang et al, 2003), Detection and Estimation Theory (Axelsson 2000a), 
Optimization (Cabrera et al, 2002; Lee et al, 2002a), etc. 
 
For RT-IDS, one paramount design criteria is the survivability under overload attacks 
(or DOS attacks), which are attacks that aim to subvert the IDS. During overload 
attacks, the attackers launch a stream of meaningless events to IDS. When the events 
volume exceeds the proceeding capacity of IDS, the IDS becomes vulnerable to 
precisely timed attacks, even if it has corresponding rules for these attacks. Lee et al 
(2002a) propose a mechanism that once the event rate rises above the threshold, the 
IDS will reconfigure itself to process only the rules that are deemed to be critical. 
Cabrera et al (2002) expand the scope of Lee et al (2002a), and state the theory in a 
considerably more general way as optimization and control problems in RT-IDS.  
 
Remarkable as their theory is, there are still vague points in their works which call for 
further research. Firstly, both of the two works consider only the event rate as 
reference signal. No other reference signal is referred and they also have not discussed 
what kind of information other than the event rate can be referred to decide when to 
reconfigure the RT-IDS. Secondly, Cabrera et al (2002) propose that the rule portfolio 
of RT-IDS can be changed continuously through a trial-and-error process according to 
the change of various parameters. However, there is scarce information about when to 
resume the original rule portfolio, and when need to compute for a new rule portfolio 
again. Lastly, only one single defensive strategy is used to decide the timing of IDS 
reconfiguration. We are not clear about 1) whether the performance of other defensive 
strategies will be better or worse than the old one and 2) what is the relationship 
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between the defensive strategy and the performance of RT-IDS. It is these unclear 
aspects that stimulate the research of this dissertation. 
 
In this thesis, we will build a software-based test-bed using NS2 (Fall and Varadhan, 
2005) to test the performance of RT-IDS under overload attacks. The RT-IDS will be 
built under the frame of Cabrera et al (2002) and Lee et al (2002a). Different defensive 
strategies and reference signals are utilized to decide the timing of IDS reconfiguration. 
So, research in this thesis can be regarded as the complement of the works of Cabrera 
et al (2002) and Lee et al (2002a). Through the comparison of different simulation 
results, we find out that certain defensive strategy which refers to more environment 
information performs better than the one proposed by Cabrera et al (2002) and Lee et 
al (2002a). We also unveil, at least partially, the relationship between the performances 
of RT-IDS and the timing to reconfigure the IDS. Thus, through the research in this 
thesis, we contribute a way of designing defensive strategy for RT-IDS that will 
perform better under the theory of Cabrera et al (2002) and Lee et al (2002a). It may 
lead to more robust RT-IDS under overload attacks in the future. 
 
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
This thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the theory of Cabrera et al 
(2002) and Lee et al (2002a). An adaptive IDS model utilizing Performance 
Adaptation and System Reconfiguration with Knapsack Constrains (Papadimitriou and 
Steiglitz, 1982) will be presented. Its disadvantage and improvement space are pointed 
out. Chapter 3 presents the architecture and structure of our simulation in NS2, an 
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open-source network simulator. Some practical considerations, such as the setting of 
various parameters, will be claimed. Chapter 4 provides a new measurement for 
evaluating the performance of RT-IDS. Three traffic modes that will be used in our 
simulation are clearly defined. Simulation results of different defensive strategies 
under different scenarios have been shown. Their performances are carefully compared. 
The internal mechanism in IDS is analyzed partially. Chapter 5 gives the conclusion of 




Optimization and Control Problems in RT-IDS 
2.1 Introduction 
Real time network-based Intrusion Detection System (RT-IDS) is required to make a 
decision about the presence of an intrusion as soon as possible in real world operation. 
Therefore, IDS researchers consider using rules of low computational cost in such 
environment. Fan et al (2000) and Lee et al (2002b) applied a cost model in off-line 
IDS. In this model, several key factors are included: (1) the computational cost of the 
rules utilized for detection, (2) the false alarm cost and detection cost of the various 
attack classes, and (3) the accuracy of the rules, represented by their detection and 
false alarm rates. Rule sets with high cost are generally more accurate, but require 
larger computational time. Rule sets with low cost run faster, but are usually less 
accurate. Depending on the relative weight attached to timeliness and accuracy, 
different sets of rules are used. This off-line technique is utilized in RT-IDS by 
Cabrera et al (2002) and Lee et al (2002a) to enhance the survivability. 
 
In the works of Cabrera et al (2002) and Lee et al (2002a), RT-IDS is studied as 
queuing systems. Following the idea of Fan et al (2000) and Lee et al (2002b), they 
construct a cost model based on Bayesian approach (Tree, 1968) to design RT-IDS 
which can survive under overload attacks, or DOS attacks. Lee et al (2002a) proposes 
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a scheme where the event rate entering the IDS is watched. During “peaceful” time, a 
full rule set is utilized, covering all known attacks. When the event rate rises above a 
certain threshold, the system reconfigures itself to process only the rules that are 
deemed to be critical. This procedure is termed load shedding, following the 
terminology introduced in real time multimedia applications (Compton and 
Tennehouse, 1994). Cabrera et al (2002) extend the scope of Lee et al (2002a), and 
present the mechanism in a more general way. In both works, the key idea is to solve 
an optimization problem, where the performance index depends on the accuracy of the 
rules, the Bayesian costs of detection and false alarms, and the probabilities of various 
events and attacks types. The bound in response time is modeled as a Knapsack-type 
(Martello and Toth, 1990) constraint. We will present this methodology in following 




2.2 Definition and Preliminaries of RT-IDS 
2.2.1 Denotation of Event Types, Attacks, and Detection Rules 
Events : As referred to Figure 1.1, incoming events are categorized according to their 
types. There are, say, N  event types. Each event is either normal, or contains one and 
only one attack. iE  is denoted as an arbitrary event of type i . Events types are 
characterized by their Prior Probability iπ , which means the probability that a given 
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iπ . Figure 2.1 is the illustration of 







Figure 2.1: Illustration of Event Types in RT-IDS 
 
Attacks : Each event type is subject to a certain number of attacks. Denote iN  as the 
number of attacks associated with an event of type i . The attacks are denoted as ijA , 
where iNj K,2,1= . We say that iji AE ←  when ijA  is present in iE , and 0ii AE ←  






 known attacks, i.e. attacks for 
which detection rules are available in RT-IDS. Attacks are characterized by the 
following parameters: 
 
(1) Prior Probability: The probability ijp  that an event of type i  contain ijA , i.e. 






ijp , Ni L,2,1= , where 0ip  is the prior probability 
that an event type is normal, i.e. )(: 00 iii AEp ←Ρ= . 
 
rule portfolio for event type 2E  







rule portfolio for event type iE  
rule portfolio for event type NE  
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(2) False Alarm Cost: The cost associated with a response triggered by a false alarm 




(3) Damage Cost: The cost associated with attack ijA  being missed by the IDS, 
denoted as βijC . 
 
Detection Rules : We set that there are a number, ijn , of detection rules associated 
with each attack ijA . Denote the rules as ijkR , where ijnk ,,2,1 L= . We say that 
0i
r
ijk AR ←  when ijkR  reports that event iE  is normal. Detection Rules are 
characterized by the following parameters: 
 
(1) False Alarm Rate: The False Alarm Rate of rule ijkR  denoted by ijkα  is defined as: 
)|( 0iiij
r
ijkijk AEAR ←←Ρ=α  
 
(2) False Negative Rate: The False Negative Rate (or Missed Detection Rate) of rule 
ijkR  denoted by ijkβ  is defined as: )|( 0 ijiirijkijk AEAR ←←Ρ=β  
 
(3) Computation Time: The time needed by the processor to compute ijkR , denoted as  
ijkt . 
 
Please note that we do not consider the situation that a detection rule claims an attack 
which is not associated with this rule. That is to say 0)|( =←←Ρ ijiisrijk AEAR , 
where 0≠≠ js . Since we study misuse IDS, we suppose that an attack will definitely 
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be picked out from the event by corresponding rule if and only if the event is inspected 








Figure 2.2: Illustration of Attacks and Detection Rules 
 
 
2.2.2 Rule Portfolio and System Reconfiguration 
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:  active rules. We denote ijR  as rule chosen to cover ijA , i.e. 'ijkij RR = , for 
some { }ijnk ,,2,1' L∈ . We denote 'ijkij αα = , 'ijkij ββ =  and 'ijkij tt =  as the parameters 
corresponding to the active rule ijR  in this case. If no rule is covering ijA , we 
write 0ijij RR = . In this case, we have 0=ijα , 1=ijβ  (no rule, therefore no false 
alarms and no detections), and 0=ijt . The rule portfolio at time τ  denoted by Ρ  is 
simply the union of all rules, i.e.: 
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iP  are the active detection rules covering attacks on events of type i . Typically, ijkα  
and ijkβ  decrease with the complexity of ijkR , i.e. complex rules are more accurate than 
simpler rules. Here, complexity measures the computational effort required to compute 
whether ij
r
ijk AR ← . The Computation Time ijkt  increases with the complexity of the 
rules. If computation time is not a concern, one covers each attack with its most 
accurate rule, like what off-line IDS does. However, when the available computation 
time is scarce, we have a trade-off involving the ijkt  and : (1) the accuracy of the rules 
given by ijkα  and ijkβ , (2) the likelihood that a given attack is present, which depends 
on the Prior Probability of the events iπ  and the Prior Probability of the attacks ijp , 
and (3) the Damage Costs and False Alarm Costs of the attacks, given by αijC  and 
β
ijC . 
Here are two cases to consider. In the first case, the decision is made just once, and 
static rule configuration is used for all time. In the second case, rule portfolio is 
renewed, following variations in the operational conditions of the system. Without any 
doubt, the second case is more attractive to us, which is called system reconfiguration 
for RT-IDS. System Reconfiguration is the process of updating rule portfolio in 
response to changes in operational conditions. In the following section, we consider a 
Knapsack Problem (Martello and Toth, 1990) of rule selection, assuming that there 
exists only one rule for each attack. Then, the decision is actually about which attack to 
cover. We will describe a principled procedure to select the rule portfolio when bounds 
on computation time are present. 
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2.3 Selecting Rule Portfolios under Knapsack Constraints 



















Figure 2.4: Processing Events of Type i  
 
Upon arrival in the system, events are placed on a common queue as depicted in Figure 
2.3. The queue has only one server, but the nature of service performed on an event 
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depends on the event type. Events of type i  are only subjected to the rules belonging 
to iΡ . The rules are applied sequentially, as depicted in Figure 2.4. Here each attack ijA  
is covered by only one rule ijR , i.e. 1=ijn  (See Section 2.2.1). The expected value of 
the system time, queuing time plus service time (Kleinrock, 1975), for an event of 
type 'i  that arrives in the system at a time when there are im  events of type i , 
Ni ,,2,1 L= , is given by: 
 
Where iT  denotes the expected value of the service time for an event of type i . The 
system time stands for the time interval elapsed between an event entering the system 
and a decision being made about the presence or absence of an attack in the event. We 
call it the response time of IDS. The expected value of the system time for an arbitrary 
event is given by: 
 
While the IDS is performing rule computation, an attack may already be in progress at 
the target. For effective operation in real time, we want the system to have such 
property that T  is bounded by a maximum delay maxD . iT  in Equation (2.2) can be 
readily computed under the typical assumption that Ρ  remains fixed during the entire 
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where ijT  denotes the deterministic service time of an event of type i  which is 
matched by rule ijR . Here, iiNi TT =0 , since as depicted in Figure 2.4, an event of type 
i  will be labeled as normal when it passes through all the iN  rules for event type i . So 
it has the same service time of an event which is matched by rule 
iiN
R . Finally, ijT  is 
given by: 
 
because the rules, 
iiNii
RRR ,,, 21 L , are checked sequentially. Combining Equations 
















ilij pq , for 1≥j , 11 =iq , and ijiij qmv =: . Hence, the first constraint to 
be satisfied in the problem is a Knapsack constraint (Papadimitriou and Steiglitz, 
1982): 
 
ijp  and ijt  are known values, and it is assumed that estimation is available for the im . 
In practice, the mean value of the im  is selected within a suitable time window. The 
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and queue stability. In practice, maxD  is chosen as the mean inter-arrival time between 
events.  
 
2.3.2 Constraint Two: Matching Rules to Attacks 
Let { }1,0∈ijx  be defined as follows: 
1=ijx , if rule ijR  is active in Ρ  
0=ijx , if rule ijR  is not active in Ρ  
The values of ijx  determine the rule portfolio. These quantities are the arguments of 
the resulting optimization problem, or, more specifically, a Knapsack Problem (e.g. 
Papadimitriou and Steiglitz, 1982; Martello and Toth, 1990). Clearly, now we have 
ijijij xtt = , which allows us to express the Knapsack constraint in Equation (2.6) in 
terms of the ijx  as follows: 
 
Showing that the coefficient (denoted as “weight” in Knapsack Problem) ija  for each 
rule can be factored on a term that depends on the type of the event - im , a term that 















ijijiijijij tqmtva ==: , 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
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2.3.3 Value Function of Rule Portfolio 
To complete the optimization problem, we need to specify a value function to be 
maximized. We follow a Bayesian approach (e.g. Trees, 1968) and express the 
expected value of rule ijR  as: 
 
The term )1( ijijiij pC βπβ −  in Equation (2.9) corresponds to missed detections, while 
the term ijijiij pC απα )1( −−  corresponds to false alarms. We can now finally express 
the value function as a linear function of the ijx  as follows:  
 
2.3.4 The Knapsack Problem and System Reconfiguration 








































)( , where 
ijijiijijijiijijij pCpCVc απβπ αβ )1()1( −−−==  
(2.10) 
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When the parameters, ija  and ijc  (referred as “weight” and “profit” in Knapsack 
Problem), are known exactly, the problem of interest is to find a rule portfolio that 
maximizes the linear cost function subjected to the Knapsack constraint. 
 
A more meaningful method for practical implementation is to allow a range (upper and 
lower bounds) for each parameter, instead of exact measurement. Then, for any 
feasible IDS configuration Ρ , there will be a range of )(ΡV  values because of the 
range of each ijc . We may consider the “worst case” when )(ΡV  is minimal. The 
optimization target is then to find an IDS configuration that maximizes the minimal 
value. Cabrera et al (2002) show a robust optimization problem that converts this max-
min problem into an equivalent Knapsack Problem. In our simulation, to simplify the 
situation, we solve only the original Knapsack Problem. 
 
In the experiment of Lee et al (2002a), it is shown that with no exception, the IDS 
drops packets and misses attacks when the traffic volume reaches a certain threshold, 
confirming results from Shipley and Mueller (2001). To address this issue, an adaptive 
RT-IDS was implemented. It self-monitors whether the IDS response time of current 
rule portfolio )(ΡT  is greater than maxD . If yes, it will use the Knapsack Algorithm to 
re-calculate a smaller set of detection rules so that max)( DT <Ρ  and the loss is the 
minimum. This is called Performance Adaptation. Different experiments between the 
adaptive IDS and the statically configured IDS have been conducted. They have found 
that the adaptive IDS can automatically adjust its rule portfolio, whenever max)( DT >Ρ  
is detected. And it can detect more damaging attack even in the overload attack 
because the corresponding detection rule is still selected. Cabrera et al (2002) suggest 
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that this process can be used in a continuous trial-and-error effort because of the 
uncertainties in the analysis of traffic conditions, performance, and cost-benefit. It is 
called System Reconfiguration. However, they did not research further into this 




2.4 A More Comprehensive Feedback Control in RT-IDS 
2.4.1 Disadvantages in Performance Adaptation of RT-IDS 
In previous section we introduced the works of Lee et al (2002a) and Cabrera et al 
(2002). They use Performance Adaptation and System Reconfiguration to change the 
rule portfolio of IDS when the traffic volume is high so that most of the incoming 
packets can be inspected with those rules that have higher priority. Based on the nature 
of this problem, the following information is concerned to formulate an optimization 
problem with Knapsack constraint: (1) the accuracy of the rules given by their 
detection and false alarm rates, (2) the likelihood that a given attack is present, which 
depends on the prior probability of the attack, (3) the damage costs and false alarm 
costs of the attacks, (4) the number of each events in the IDS queue, (5) the expected 
service times for different events, (6) the incoming traffic volume of the network 
monitored by IDS. We argue that this process is actually a feedback control, where 
Knapsack Algorithm is activated based on feedback information maxD  of network 
environment. 
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In conducted experiments, the adaptive IDS managed to report malicious behavior in 
an overload network situation. However, the Knapsack Algorithm, which is 
implemented in adaptive IDS to compute new rule portfolio, is only activated when 
max)( DT >Ρ  is detected. Although Cabrera et al (2002) introduced System 
Reconfiguration where Performance Adaptation will be activated continuously as an 
trial-and-error process according to the change of various parameters, there is scarce 
information about when to resume the original rule portfolio, and when need to 
execute the Knapsack Algorithm again so that the rule portfolio can be reconfigured. 
They also did not discuss what network environment information other than maxD  can 
be referred to decide when to do System Reconfiguration. Since, in most of the case, 
the network administrators can not keep an eye on the network all the time to do the 
adjustment, an automatic mechanism that decides when to reconfigure the rule 
portfolio will be both necessary and beneficial. Thus, there raised a concern about the 
relationship between the timing to execute the Knapsack Algorithm and the 
performance of IDS.  
 
2.4.2 New Area of Adaptive Intrusion Detection System to Explore 
This concern stimulates the research in following chapters. Generally speaking, there 
will be such unknown aspects in Adaptive Intrusion Detection Systems that need to be 
explored. (1) Will the frequency of the execution of Knapsack Algorithm affect the 
performance of RT-IDS? (2) If it is true for the first question, how does it affect the 
performance of RT-IDS? (3) How to execute the Knapsack Algorithm so that the 
performance of IDS will be better? (4) What measurement shall we take to evaluate the 
effect of different strategies for Knapsack Algorithm execution to the RT-IDS? (5) Is 
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there any reference information other than maxD  that can be utilized to decide the 
execution of Knapsack Algorithm? 
 
Question 1 is to make clear whether there exists nexus between the timing of Knapsack 
Algorithm execution and the performance of RT-IDS. Question 2 and 3 tend to find 
out the inside mechanism of such nexus, and use knowledge about this mechanism to 
improve the performance of adaptive IDS. Question 4 aims to find out relative 
statistical information so that it can be referred to evaluate the impact of different 
strategies of Knapsack Algorithm execution to RT-IDS. Question 5 is raised to 
understand whether RT-IDS can reconfigure its rule portfolio based on information 
other than maxD . 
 
Once we get the answers of the previous 5 questions, we can try to propose a more 
comprehensive Adaptive Intrusion Detection System. It still uses the Knapsack 
Algorithm to compute new rule portfolio when the incoming traffic goes high. What 
make this new Adaptive IDS different is that there will be special part utilizing other 
feedback information from the network environment, besides the incoming traffic 
volume, to decide when to execute the Knapsack Algorithm so that the following 
requirements are satisfied: (1) there will be as less packet drop as possible so as to 
make sure that all the incoming packets will be checked by the Computing Engine, (2) 
to use as much rules as possible during the DOS attack so that the IDS can detect as 
many attacks as possible. Before we show the experimental results, we will first state 
the simulation architecture and the practical considerations for our network test-bed. 
 
Chapter 3 
Simulation Architecture and Practical Considerations 
3.1 Introduction of IDS Simulation Test-bed 
A number of researchers have shown their efforts in building test-beds for evaluation 
of Network-based IDS. A methodology for Network Intrusion Detection System, 
NIDS in short, evaluation is described by Robert et al (1999), with the development of 
a test-bed simulating the behavior of a large network, tracing the traffic on the test-bed, 
and using that as input to the NIDS for evaluation. Another method was proposed by 
The NSS Group (2001), which built a test-bed that used a 100 Mbit/s network with no 
real traffic. The attacks were 66 commonly available exploits like portscans, web, FTP 
and finger attacks (Northcutt and Novak, 2002) and were generated with specialized 
tools. Besides attacks, background traffic was also generated in order to test NIDS 
under different network loads. This background traffic was consisted of small (64 byte) 
and large (1514 byte) packets that consumed variable percentage of the network 
bandwidth (between zero and 100%). Besides, Shipley and Mueller (2001) tested the 
NIDS by injecting attacks into a stream of real background traffic. Schaelicke et al 
(2003) used the TTCP Utility to generate traffic between a pair of hosts in their test-
bed.  
 
Athanasiades et al (2003) also proposed an environment suitable for NIDS evaluation. 
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This environment uses synthetic background traffic and controlled injection of attacks 
in order to emulate a real network. Furthermore, it is equipped with the ability to 
respond to traffic in real time and generate traffic at gigabit speed so as to provide 
more realistic traffic scenarios. 
 
Lee et al (2002) used LARIAT (Rossey et al, 2001), an extension of the test-bed 
created for DARPA 1998 and 1999 intrusion detection evaluations, to conduct the RT-
IDS experiments. They built a network test-bed based on LARIAT by plugging the 
Intrusion Detection modules into the test-bed to capture audit data and invoke response. 
 
Most of the test-beds are built on a “Real” network, i.e. there exists network 
communication between hosts on the test-bed. Very few research of IDS was 
conducted in a purely software environment. This is because, in most of the case, the 
interest of researcher lays on domain knowledge about the information assurance 
systems. Their target is to find out the “signatures” of intrusions, so that the intrusion 
packets can be “picked out” from enormous network traffic. As a result of this, 
researchers need to inspect real network packets thoroughly. So, test-beds constructed 
on real network are predominated in the community. However, the target of our 
research is quite different from others. We are not interested in the information 
contained in network packets. We are interested in the IDS performance from a system 
and control point of view. To make it clear, we are not interested in how to find out 
specific intrusions from network traffic, but intend to enhance the survivability of RT-
IDS under overload attack so that no packet can escape the inspection of RT-IDS when 
DOS attack happens. In our research, we concern about two points: (1) to prevent 
packets dropping from the internal queue of RT-IDS when the network traffic goes 
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high, (2) to try to implement as much important rules as possible. Moreover, we are 
interested for better defensive strategy, not real measurement in IDS evaluation. All of 
these can be emulated through queue management and virtual time scheduling. Thus, it 
is the nature of our research target that allows us to use software-based test-bed, 
instead of a real test-bed.  
 
To use a software-based test-bed does have advantages. First, the cost of building a 
software-based test-bed is quite lower than constructing a real network test-bed. It is 
especially suitable for those research teams that possess limited research fund. Second, 
a software-based test-bed is much easier to configure than a real test-bed. So, it is more 
convenient for researchers to setup new network scenarios and implement defensive 
strategies to test their ideas and theories. 
 
On the other side, we do have to make it clear that software-based test-bed has 
limitation. It is, after all, not a real environment. The simulation results reported in this 
thesis will be more convincing if corresponding experiments in real network 
environment can be conducted. The value of research in this thesis is to point out the 
feasible direction that can improve the performance of RT-IDS under overload attacks, 
and try to study the relationships between various factors that affect the performance of 
RT-IDS. Real experiments can be done to further validate our research results. 
 
There are two main kinds of networking simulation software available in the 
community, NS2 (Fall and Varadhan, 2005) and OPNET. NS2 is open-source software, 
which can be downloaded from internet for free. OPNET is commercial software. We 
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choose NS2 as the software to build our IDS simulation test-bed. The version of NS2 
we used in simulation is 2.2.7. 
 
 
3.2 Building Simulation Test-bed in NS2 
3.2.1 Overview 
NS2 is an event driven network simulator written in C++ and OTCL, and is developed 
at UC Berkeley that simulates variety of IP networks. It implements network protocols 
such as TCP and UPD, traffic source behavior such as FTP, Telnet, Web, CBR and 
VBR, router queue management mechanism such as Drop Tail, RED and CBQ, 
routing algorithms such as Dijkstra (Bertserkas and Gallager, 1992), and more. 
 
NS2 is Object-oriented Tcl (OTcl) script interpreter that has many network 
components, object libraries, and network setup module libraries, which are 
implemented as member functions of the base simulator object. 
 
Another major component of NS2 besides network objects is the event scheduler, 
which is a key element for our simulation. In NS2, an event scheduler keeps track of 
simulation time and fires all the events in the event queue scheduled for the current 
time by invoking appropriate network components, which usually are the ones who 
issued the events, and let them do the appropriate action associated with packet pointed 
by the event. Figure 3.1 shows each network object using an event scheduler. Note that 
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a network object that issues an event is the one who handles the event later at 
scheduled time. 
 
Figure 3.1: Event Scheduler 
 
The event used in our simulation is a packet ID that is unique for a packet with 
scheduled time and the pointer to an object that handles the event. Network 
components here communicate with others by passing packets, which does not 
consume actual simulation time. All the network components that need to spend some 
simulation time handling a packet (i.e. need a delay) use the event scheduler by issuing 
an event for the packet and waiting for the event to be fired to itself before doing 
further action handling the packet. For example, a network switch component that 
simulates a switch with 20 microseconds of switching delay issues an event for a 
packet to be switched to the scheduler as an event 20 microsecond later. The scheduler 
dequeues the event after 20 microseconds and fires it to the switch component, which 
then passes the packet to an appropriate output link component. For our simulation, the 
packets processing delay of the rule portfolio of RT-IDS is implemented in the event 
scheduler. 




Because that NS2 is not designed particularly for IDS evaluation, we need to add 
related modules so that the offensive and defensive action through the network can be 
properly emulated, and, in addition to that, the designed simulations can run in NS2 
environment. Generally speaking, we need to implement two modules to NS2 (see 
Figure 3.2): (1) The traffic generating module, which includes both the background 
traffic and intrusion traffic; (2) The traffic receiving module, which will be embedded 
with the functionality of libpcap queue, a portable framework for capturing low-level 
network traffic, and also the main characteristics and functionalities of IDS. Although 
we are in the research interest of survivability of RT-IDS, we hope that the test-bed 
possesses the ability to emulate most of the behavior of a real IDS, including pattern 







Figure 3.2: Module Interaction in Test-bed 
 
Section 3.2.2 will present the traffic generating module in detail. Section 3.2.3 contains 
thorough information about traffic receiving module. Section 3.2.4 shows the 
simulation topology of our test-bed. 
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3.2.2 The Traffic Generating Module 
The traffic generating module is responsible for making and sending both the 
background traffic packets and the intrusion traffic packets. From the RT-IDS point of 
view, the traffic generating module is like the outside part (e.g. the Internet) of a 
network (e.g. Local Area Networks), which is being monitored by the RT-IDS. Since 
packets format in NS2 is totally different from that of real network packet, first 
modification we need to do is to create a new packet format in NS2 so that it contains 
all the required protocol fields. Second, we need to fill proper contents into these fields 
to activate corresponding IDS behaviors. Third, these packets should be sent to 
destination under certain distributions and orders. All the added functionalities should 
be easy to configure, making it convenient to test different attack scenarios. 
 
3.2.2.1 Build the Simulation Packets with Real Protocol Fields 
The misuse IDS rules find out malicious incoming traffic by inspecting the contents of 
packets. These contents include protocol header information and payloads of packets. 
However, in NS2, the original packet format contains neither header fields nor 
payloads, making it impossible for the IDS rules to check the packet contents. Adding 
these fields becomes necessary.  
 
We consider the rules from open-source IDS Snort (Roesch, 1999) as the detection 
rules in simulation. There are four protocols that Snort currently analyzes for 
suspicious behavior – TCP, UDP, ICMP and IP. As a result of this, we will add fields 
for these protocols in NS2 packet format. The detailed header information of these four 
protocols is shown in Figure 3.3(a) – (d). The numbers in header line of these figures 
Chapter 3 Simulation Architecture and Practical Considerations 
 
34
stand for occupied bits of these fields. To further explain the meaning of these fields or 
the interaction of these protocols is far beyond the scope of this thesis. Interested 
readers can refer to the work of Stevens (1994). 
                                                
 
(a) IP Header 
 
(b) TCP Header 
 
(c) UDP Header 
 
(d) ICMP Header 
Figure 3.3: Added Header Formats for IP/TCP/UDP/ICMP 
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In NS2, there is no payload content of a packet. There only exists a parameter 
indicating the size of a packet. This is because NS2 is often being used in a situation 
that more concern is being given to statistical information of a large network topology, 
e.g. congestion control, network thoughput analysis. We solve the problem by adding a 
“payload” field to the packet format, which is a string of 100 bytes long. Then, content 
can be filled into this field so that the intrusion rules can check. This is actually the 
same as real packets, since in actual packets encapsulation (Northcutt and Novak, 2002) 
makes the payload tightly follow corresponding header data.  
 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the internal structure of customized packet format in NS2. “cmn 
header”, “rtp header” and “trace header” etc. are original headers of NS2 packet format 
which can be used by any network object as needed. Users can define their own header 
format at the end of the NS header stack. Here “ip_ver_” is name of a variable. We use 
different variables to represent fields of various protocols. Payload can be added at the 
end of header stack. But we choose to implement the payload as an independent field 



















ip_ver_ : ip version field 
ip_hdlen_ : ip header length field
ip_id_ : ip identification field 
…….. 
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3.2.2.2 Fill Packets’ Fields 
In our test-bed, there are two kinds of packets to make. One is the packet of 
background traffic. The other packets are the intrusion packets. 
 
For background traffic, we fill random values into most of the fields (i.e. the variables), 
except some special fields, e.g. the “protocol” field in IP header, which indicates what 
kind of protocol is encapsulated in the next level. Another example is the “destination 
port” of TCP and UDP, which will be used to determine what kind of “event” this 
packet belongs to. To fill most of the other fields with random value is reasonable, 
since the IDS rules will fire an alarm only when finding out an intrusion packet, which 
has specific values in some particular fields. So, these random values are the same as 
normal values (normal traffic) for intrusion detection rules. Antonatos et al (2004) 
pointed out that when using random payloads in evaluating the performance of IDS, 
the timing of pattern matching is not so close to the case when real payloads is used. 
However, we are now trying to evaluate IDS in a purely software environment, so the 
processing delay is not real passed time but only a numerical interpretation that 
indicating the firing of next event in event scheduler. So, actually, the real processing 
time for packets in NS2 will not affect the IDS performance in simulation. 
 
Unlike packet of background traffic, the intrusion packet must have particular values in 
some specific protocol fields so that they can be “searched out” by detection rules. 
Referring to particular detection rules, we can fill any desired values into specific 
packet fields to make expected attack. Thus it enhances the flexibility of our test-bed. 
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3.2.2.3 Send the Simulation Packets 
The background traffic will be sent to destination, i.e. the traffic receiving module, 
through a stochastic process. This is sort of natural from the RT-IDS point of view, 
since the incoming traffic may enter the network at anytime. Currently, the test-bed is 
using a uniform distribution for the arriving packets. Other distribution which is more 
popular for general network traffic can also be implemented when necessary, like the 
Poisson distribution or Normal distribution (Bertserkas and Gallager, 1992). 
 
On the other hand, the intrusion packet will be sent to traffic receiving module in pre-
defined fixed time slot. This allows the user to design arbitrary intrusion script. It is 
also true for today’s precisely organized network intrusion activities. 
 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the logic of generating background traffic in OTCL and C++ 
level. Command “Start” and “Stop” can simply control the starting and stopping of 
background traffic in OTCL level. The logic of generating intrusion packet is similar; 
however, the intrusion is usually a single or several packets, not a series of packets. 
 
3.2.2.4 Implement the Module as Agents 
The traffic generating module is implemented as an Agent in NS2. Agents represent 
endpoints where network-layer packets are constructed or consumed, and are used in 
the implementation of protocols at various layers. Because that, firstly, Agent can 
communicate each other directly, we choose to implement both the traffic generating 
module and traffic receiving module as Agents. Another reason is that, it is easy to 
append or remove an Agent in NS2, thus make it easy to debug the code, solve the 
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Figure 3.6: Traffic Creation in Traffic Generating Module 

















Pick a random number T 
between 0.005 and 0.01.
Set a timer which will be 
triggered T second later.
When timer is triggered, 
make a NS2 packet, fill 
each field with random 
value within feasible 
scope and send the 
packet immediately. 
Stop the timer 
immediately. 




3.2.3 The Traffic Receiving Module 
The traffic receiving module is responsible for packets processing after receiving them. 
In real networks, RT-IDS works as a “sniffer” of monitored network. All the packets 
that enter the network (e.g. LAN) will be “copied” to RT-IDS for analyzing (See 
Figure 1.1). This process is the same as traffic receiving module (IDS) receiving the 
packets from traffic generating module (outside networks) directly. After the incoming 
packets reach the IDS node, their will firstly be put into an internal queue. Then, 
depending on the event type, e.g. FTP, ICMP, Telnet, packets will be checked by 
different rule sets, just like what we have discussed in previous chapter. After the rule 
checking action, a processing time will be recorded, and it will be used by the 
destination node to schedule rule checking for next packet in the queue. As we can see, 
the traffic receiving module possesses more functions than traffic generating module 
does. First, it should manage an internal queue for incoming packets. Second, packets 
will be checked with current “active” rule portfolio to figure out processing time that 
needed for rule checking. Third, the processing delay should be made effective in the 
module, since NS2 previously does not support time delay in single node processing. 
Fourth, there should be a function in charge of the calculation of rule portfolio, making 
IDS rule configuration possible. All the added functionalities should be easy to 
configure, making it convenient to adjust to different defensive strategies. 
 
3.2.3.1 Internal Queue 
The internal queue stands for “buffer” of real Intrusion Detection System. It is actually 
a first-in-first-out list that can hold incoming packets temporally in the sequence of 
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how they enter. Packets released from the queue will receive service (rule inspecting) 
immediately (Figure 1.1). When there is packet being processed (rule inspecting), the 
queue will remain a “blocked” status. At that time, new packets can enter, but no 
packet can leave. Once the queue is full, it will begin to drop packets when there are 










Figure 3.7: Logic of Internal Queue of the Traffic Receiving Module 
 
3.2.3.2 Inspected by Current Rule Portfolio 
The test-bed has proper interface to implement IDS rules. For simulation convenience, 
we select the rules of stateless IDS, e.g. Snort. As our research target is to test how to 
manipulate a lot of detection rules better in real time, we only refer to Snort about its 
rules, but not its pre-processors or other tools. Based on the packets’ encapsulated 
protocol or/and destination port, they will be classified into different event types. 
Different event types stand for different rules sets those incoming packets will meet. 
Event types can be HTTP, Telnet, FTP, ICMP, etc. Actually this is an optional 
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function, since, in our model shown in Chapter 2, what effects the performance of RT-
IDS under overload attack is the processing time of each rule. So, this function may be 
regarded as an add-on module of the software-based test-bed. 
 
3.2.3.3 Processing Delay 
This is a major problem when building the test-bed in NS2, since original NS2 
simulation timing mechanism does not include the packet processing delay. So, 
corresponding codes should be added into the destination node. As introduced in 
Section 3.2.1, there is an event scheduler in NS2 that fires pre-scheduled events. This 
event scheduler is actually the “time system” of NS2 simulation. Then, the basic idea 
is to schedule delayed events in a later time slot in the event scheduler. 
 
In implementation, each rule has its own rule processing time, just like the model 
presented in Chapter 2. After a packet being checked with current rule portfolio, the 
traffic receiving module will record the total time it takes, based on how many 
effective rules this packet has gone through. Because that Knapsack Algorithm is 
calculated in a separate process, the recorded total processing time needs to be 
combined with the KS algorithm computing time, if any, together into a so called 
“total processing time”. Then, the event scheduler will schedule the event of next 
packet processing “total processing time” later. Thus, the processing delay of the test-
bed works. Figure 3.8 illustrates the logic of realizing processing delay in traffic 
receiving module. The rule inspection there is actually optional for the test-bed. How 
to calculate the processing delay and how to implement it are key points for the 
simulation. 
 
















Figure 3.8: Logic of Realizing Processing Delay in Traffic Receiving Module 
 
3.2.3.4 The Knapsack Routine 
As shown in Chapter 2, the rule computation is a Knapsack Problem. So, in the test-
bed, we coded a process in the traffic receiving module to execute the Knapsack 
Algorithm. This process can be evoked according to different defensive strategies, e.g. 
fixed time period or certain conditions etc (See Chapter 4). When being evoked, it can 
compute a new rule portfolio based on relative information of network environment. 
The updated rule portfolio will be implemented for each packet that is currently in the 
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(Lee et al, 2002a) with the computing time of Knapsack algorithm mentioned in 
Section 3.2.3.3. 
 
3.2.3.5 Implement the Module as Agents 
Like the traffic generating module, the traffic receiving module is also implemented as 
an Agent in NS2. It receives the miscellaneous traffic from traffic generating module 
directly, and then processes it with these functional parts. A packet will be dropped 
when the queue is full. After being processed, a packet will be freed from the computer 










Figure 3.9: Traffic Inspection in Traffic Receiving Module 
 
3.2.4 Simulation Topology of Test-bed 
The simulation topology and scenario are implemented at OTcl interpreter (Fall and 
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module are coded. As shown in Figure 3.10, the simulation topology is quite simple, 
comparing to the architecture of traffic modules. Node 0 is being attached with the 
agent of traffic generating module, while the agent of traffic receiving module lays in 
Node 1. These two nodes are connected with a bi-directional link (Fall and Varadhan, 
2005) of no transmission delay, which means that the generated packet will reach node 
1 immediately after it is sent from node 0. 
 
The advantage of such simple topology and scenario is that it allows the users to focus 
attention to the traffic modules. Since NS2 is a large scale and intricate tool, complex 
topology and scenario will only make the simulation hard to control and adjust. 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Simulation Topology of Test-bed 
 
 
3.3 Practical Considerations and Parameter Selection 
The design and construction of our test-bed are comprehensive. It can emulate most of 
the functions of a real network test-bed. However, there are two reasons why we 
decide to do the simulation in a simple but effective way. First, the main target of our 
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research is to study the survivability of RT-IDS under press. So what we care most is 
the relationship between the network environment and the packets processing time of 
IDS. Other performance of RT-IDS, like the accuracy of intrusion rules, is not our 
major interest. Second, some parameters can only be obtained from tedious 
experiments that are quite time-consuming. It is not the accuracy of these parameters 
but the impact of different defensive strategies on RT-IDS that we concern most. So, 
we just need to estimate these less important parameters in a reasonable way and keep 
them constant under different simulation assumptions. Moreover, Cabrera et al (2002) 
proposed a robust model in which knowing lower and upper bounds of those 
parameters is sufficient enough to calculate the rule portfolio. In the flowing sections, 
we will state the selection of various parameters and practical considerations in both 
traffic generating module and traffic receiving module.  
 
3.3.1 Practical Considerations in Traffic Generating 
Based on the mathematical model in Chapter 2, we need to define the event types in 
network traffic. Event types are determined by the encapsulated protocol and/or 
destination port number. Actually, in simulation, events types can be defined at the 
convenience of users. We define event types based on the rule of Snort. Table 3.1 
shows the events definition in our simulation. 
 
To acquire Prior Probability iπ  of event i , we send the miscellaneous simulation 
traffic in a controlled manner. 85% of the generated traffic encapsulates TCP protocol. 
10% encapsulates UDP. The rest 5% contains ICMP. Moreover, we also assume that in 
TCP and UDP, each event type has the same probability. Then, we have the 
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probabilities of each event as shown in Table 3.2. For the Prior Probability ijp of 
attacks, we assume that all attacks belonging to one event have same probabilities. In a 
real networking environment, these probabilities can vary when time elapses. Then we 
can choose to use the robust model of Cabrera et al (2002) and update these 
probabilities periodically on basis of traffic measurements. However, we are here to 
make the situation simple so that the Knapsack Algorithm can be used to do the rule 
computation job. Thus we can put our focus on different defensive strategies. 
 
Table 3.1: Events Definition in Simulated Traffic 
Event Type Protocol Encapsulated Destination Port 
FTP TCP 21 
Telnet TCP 23 
SMTP TCP 25 
HTTP TCP 80 
DNS UDP 53 
SNMP UDP 161 
ICMP ICMP N/A 
OTHERS None of above 
 
 
We use a CBR (Constant Bit Rate) traffic source which is attached to a UDP agent in 
Node 0 (Figure 3.10) to simulate overload attacks. It can constantly send packets to 
destination at any packet size and time interval which are configured by users. Since, 
the overload attack is, in reality, a burst of meaningless packets that directed to victim 
machines in a very short period of time, we believe that the CBR traffic source can 
emulate the effect of overload attack quite well. All the packets sizes, in both the 
background traffic and the CBR traffic, are set to 500 bytes. Users can certainly set 
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many different distributions in packets size, and the packets sizes do vary a lot in 
reality. However, we believe that the simple configuration is enough to test our 
simulation. The information we use for calculating different rule portfolio is mainly 
incoming traffic volume, not packet size. The CBR packets will be categorized as 
event “OTHERS” (Table 3.1) by the IDS. 
 
Table 3.2: Probability of Each Event 




Probability iπ  
FTP TCP 0.85 0.85 x 0.2 
Telnet TCP 0.85 0.85 x 0.2 
SMTP TCP 0.85 0.85 x 0.2 
HTTP TCP 0.85 0.85 x 0.2 
DNS UDP 0.1 0.1 / 3 
SNMP UDP 0.1 0.1 / 3 
ICMP ICMP 0.05 0.05 
OTHERS None of above 0.85 x 0.2 + 0.1 / 3 
 
 
Although our test-bed allows us to send specific intrusion in one single packet, it is not 
a “must” to utilize this functionality in our simulation. Recording the packets dropping 
rate and the coverage of rule portfolio is sufficient enough to evaluate the survivability 
of Adaptive IDS. So, as a result, we did not send any “man-made” intrusion packet to 
the destination in our simulation. We believe that this decision will not affect the 
performance evaluation of RT-IDS. And the intrusion packet can be included in the 
simulation in the future to further check the impact of different defensive strategies. 
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3.3.2 Practical Considerations in Traffic Receiving 
For rules derived from anomaly detection systems, the False Alarm Rate ijα  and False 
Negative Rate ijβ  can be estimated using suitable training data sets. On the other side, 
misuse detection rules for well defined attacks will have well understood behavior, e.g. 
0== ijij βα . Based on this fact, we assume that all the rules used in simulation will 
have 0== ijij βα . So equation (2.9) becomes equation (3.1) below: 
 
Now the problem about False Alarm Rate or False Negative Rate is solved. The IDS 
rules will respond and only respond to those packets that contain known intrusion. So, 
what really makes sense in testing the survivability of RT-IDS is the processing time 
of intrusion rules. Without implementing the real rule set in the test-bed, we hold the 
event packet in the traffic receiving module for a period of time to say that it has been 
processed (checked by corresponding rules). This mechanism is actually the same as 
real environment in process timing (See Figure 3.8). As for the content matching part, 
it can be added into the test-bed when needed. However, it is definitely not an 
indispensable part in testing the survivability of RT-IDS. 
 
About the processing time of different IDS rules, there are roughly two types of rules. 
First type only inspects the packet’s header information, the other will check into the 
packet’s payload. Obviously, examining the payload of a packet takes much more time 
than only examining header information. According to recent research achievement 
(Cabrera et al, 2004), the mean payload checking time is approximately 4.5 times 
longer than mean header checking time. They also list detailed rule processing time 
ijiijij pCV πβ=  (3.1) 
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under different test conditions. Based on their experiment data and the thought that we 
choose the simulation in a simple manner, the processing time of rules that only check 
the header information is set to 10 microseconds, while the processing time of those 
that check the payload content is set to 55 microseconds. The absolute value of rule 
processing time is actually meaningless, because of the fact that it depends heavily on 
the capacity of computers. The lower and upper bound of rule processing time can be 
covered by the robust model (Cabrera et al, 2002), while we only deal with the 
simplest case. Running time for Knapsack Algorithm is set to 3 milliseconds, as 
referring to Lee et al (2002a). 
 
From Equation 3.1, we know that only the Damage Cost βijC  needs to be estimated. In 
a real experiment, attacks can be first categorized by results, e.g. U2R, R2L, DOS, and 
Probing (Lippmann et al, 2000), then further by techniques, and still further by targets 
(e.g., a server or a workstation) (Lee et al, 2002b). Thus, the knowledge about the 
attacks and assets can be used to qualitatively measure the value of βijC  in relative 
scales (Northcutt, 1999; Lee et al, 2002b). We set the Damage Cost of each type of 
intrusions in Table 3.3, referring to the work of Fan et al (2000) and Lee et al (2002b). 
 
We choose the rule set for each event as shown in Table 3.4, where we list the number 
of rules that cover different intrusion categories (e.g. U2R, R2L) for every event, and 
also the number of rules that do or not do payload checking for event. This is 
absolutely not the real case, but only a test rule set after referring to Snort rules. 
 
There is a routine process, “heart beat” function, in the traffic receiving module, which 
periodically collects network information like incoming traffic volume and packets 
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drop rate. The collected information will be used to compute a new rule portfolio that 
is suitable for current network condition. Similar process also exists in Snort. It is a 
very lightweight process that occupies little system resource (Lee et al, 2002a). Hence, 
the process time of this routine job can be regarded as “factor in” (Lee et al, 2002a) of 
other processing time, like the time needed for changing rule portfolio. We configure 
the “heart beat” function so that it is executed every 0.1 second 
 
Table 3.3: Damage Cost of Different Intrusions 
Intrusion Category Damage Cost 
User to Root (U2R) 100 
Remote to Local (R2L) 50 
Denial-of-Service (DOS) 30 
Probing 2 
 

















FTP 70 70 0 10 50 5 5 
Telnet 15 15 0 5 5 1 4 
SMTP 60 60 0 40 15 5 0 
HTTP 45 45 0 0 45 0 0 
DNS 20 20 0 15 0 0 5 
SNMP 17 10 7 0 0 0 17 
ICMP 100 20 80 0 10 0 90 
OTHERS 95 45 50 35 20 30 10 
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In our simulation, only a Knapsack Problem (Lee et al, 2002a) is considered, since the 
traffic assumption and IDS condition are both simplified to a certain level. The robust 
version of this problem (Cabrera et al, 2002) is more suitable for a real test-bed. 
 
Chapter 4 
Simulation Results and Analysis 
4.1 Measurement Selection and Traffic Modes 
4.1.1 Measurement of Defensive Strategy 
The purpose of our research is to find out “better” defensive strategy that can make 
IDS possess stronger survivability under overload attack. However, the meaning of 
“better” is still left undefined. We must notice that the goals we are trying to approach 
are (1) there is no/less packet loss so that each incoming packet will be inspected by 
RT-IDS, (2) to get broader range rule coverage so that we have more opportunities to 
find out intrusions in network traffic. Cabrera et al (2002) and Lee et al (2002a) 
provided a solution for the first problem by implementing Knapsack Algorithm 
(Martello and Toth, 1990) in RT-IDS. We would like to introduce new measurement 
here to measure the degree of “coverage” of different rule portfolios. Then, this 
“coverage” will be used to evaluate the performance of different defensive strategies. 
 
Since the rule portfolio changes in Adaptive IDS during overload attack, the total 
number of rules in the rule portfolio becomes inconsistent. Taking Table 4.1 for an 
example, it lists the total number of rules in Adaptive IDS at different simulation times. 
We sum up the number of rules in rule portfolio at each recorded time, and then divide 
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the sum by the summation of total number of rules in original rule portfolio. We refer 
this parameter as coverageP . Equation 4.1 illustrates how to calculate coverageP  in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Number of Rules in Rule Portfolio at Different Simulation Times 
Simulation Time 
(Sec) 
Number of Rules in Rule 
Portfolio 
Number of Rules in Original 
Rule Portfolio 
6.9 395 422 
7.0 389 422 
7.1 422 422 
7.2 389 422 
7.3 390 422 
7.4 390 422 
7.5 422 422 
7.6 389 422 
 
 
It is straightforward to see that higher coverageP  stands for broader coverage of rules 
throughout overload attack, which means that RT-IDS can detect more intrusions 
under press.  
 
Some one may argue that coverageP  is not comprehensive enough to evaluate the 
“quality” of rule portfolio. It seems that a measurement considering both the number of 
active rules and αijC /
β
ijC  value of corresponding intrusions could be a wiser choice. 
However, during overload attack, the Knapsack constraint will filter out those rules 




+++++++=coverageP  (4.1) 
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“weight” of each rule depends a great deal on the value of im , which varies intensively 
during DOS attack. Rules become vulnerable to be dropped when they belong to the 
same event category as that of the overload attack packets. So, if we take αijC /
β
ijC  into 
consideration for a measurement, this measurement of rule portfolio may vary when 
different events of overload attacks come, even if these overload attacks have the same 
distribution and traffic volume.  
 
4.1.2 Traffic Modes of Simulation Scenario 
There will be three different traffic modes in the simulation to emulate various network 
conditions. The strategies we proposed will be tested in these traffic modes to check 
their survivability and effectiveness. Table 4.2 shows these traffic modes and explains 
them in details.  
 
Table 4.2: Three Traffic Modes Used in Simulation 
Traffic Mode Description 
A 
Total simulation duration: 30 sec.  
Background traffic: 2.0 ~ 27.0 sec. Overload attack 5.0 ~ 23.0 sec. 
B 
Total simulation duration: 30 sec. Background traffic: 2.0 ~ 27.0 sec. 
Overload attack 5.0 ~ 23.0 sec. Higher traffic 10.0 ~ 17.0 sec. 
C 
Total simulation duration: 30 sec. Background traffic: 2.0 ~ 27.0 sec. 
Traffic burst 5.0 ~ 7.0 sec and 23.0 ~ 25.0 sec. 
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4.2 IDS Strategies and Simulation Results 
4.2.1 Intrusion Detection System with Fixed Rule Portfolio 
Strategy 4.1:  we first test the IDS performance when the rule portfolio is fixed, i.e. no 
rules will be dropped. The simulation is conducted only in traffic mode A. Figure 4.1 
shows the simulation result. As expected, incoming packets start to drop soon after the 
launching of overload attack. 
 
Figure 4.1: IDS Performance with Fixed Rule Portfolio 
4.2.2 Adaptive Intrusion Detection System 
Strategy 4.2:  now we test the Adaptive IDS performance using the strategy of Cabrera 
et al (2002) and Lee et al (2002a). The Knapsack Algorithm will be executed to 
calculate a new set of rule portfolio when the expected service time of current rule 
portfolio )(ΡT  is greater than the mean packets arrival time maxD . This strategy is tested 
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in all three traffic modes. Figure 4.2 (a) – (c) show the simulation results. We can see 
from the figures that there is no packet loss for Adaptive IDS in all of three scenarios. 
 
(a) Traffic mode A 
 
(b) Traffic mode B 




(c) Traffic mode C 
Figure 4.2: Performance of Adaptive IDS 
4.2.3 Execute Knapsack Algorithm at Fixed Rate 
Strategy 4.3:  we change the configuration so that Knapsack Algorithm is executed at 
fixed rate throughout the simulation, no matter what the traffic volume is. There are 
three scenarios we have tested for this strategy. Scenario 1: traffic mode is A. 
Knapsack Algorithm is activated every 1 second. Scenario 2: traffic mode is A. 
Knapsack Algorithm is activated every 0.5 second. Scenario 3: traffic mode is B. 
Knapsack Algorithm is activated every 0.5 second. Figure 4.3 (a) – (c) show the 
simulation results of scenario 1, 2 and 3, respectively. We can see from Figure 4.3 (a) 
and (b) that the Adaptive IDS will cease to drop packets when Knapsack Algorithm is 
executed at a properly higher rate. However, even if we adjust the Knapsack Algorithm 
execution rate at a suitable level so that no packets will lose when the traffic volume is 
high, the IDS will still drop packets when higher traffic volume comes. This is a huge 
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disadvantage of the fixed Knapsack Algorithm execution rate. We can clearly observe 
this point from Figure 4.3(c). 
 
(a) Scenario 1, traffic mode A 
 
(b) Scenario 2, traffic mode A 




(c) Scenario 3, traffic mode B 
Figure 4.3: Adaptive IDS with Fixed Knapsack Algorithm Execution Rate 
4.2.4 Execute Knapsack Algorithm Based on Traffic Information 
Strategy 4.4: we propose here a feedback strategy so that the Knapsack Algorithm is 
executed at an adaptive rate. At first, the algorithm is activated between fixed time 
intervals, just like that in strategy 4.3. After each execution of the Knapsack Algorithm, 
the logic in Table 4.3 is followed to schedule next time of running Knapsack 
Algorithm. Here maxD  stands for mean inter packets arrival time. safeT  is a threshold 
value for maxD  that is larger enough to prevent packet loss. fixT  is a pre-defined fixed 
time interval. The value of alproportionT  is shown in Equation 4.2. P  is the proportional 
factor that can be adjusted according to the performance of IDS.  
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Table 4.3: Proportional Feedback in Adaptive IDS 
 
 
There are four scenarios we have tested for this strategy. The value of P  is 200, 180, 
160 and 140 in Scenario 1 to 4, respectively. All the scenarios use traffic mode B. 
Figure 4.4 (a) – (d) show the simulation results of scenario 1 - 4, respectively. We can 
see from Figure 4.4 (a) – (d) that the extent of packets loss has ameliorated as P  
becomes small. When 140=P  in Scenario 4, no packet loss happens.  
 
(a) Scenario 1, traffic mode B, P=200 
if safeTD >=max  
schedule next execution fixT  seconds later 
else 
schedule next execution alproportionT  seconds later 
maxDPT alproportion ×=  (4.2) 




(b) Scenario 2, traffic mode B, P=180 
 
(c) Scenario 3, traffic mode B, P=160 




(d) Scenario 4, traffic mode B, P=140 
Figure 4.4: Knapsack Execution based on Proportional Feedback Information 
4.2.5 Execute Knapsack Algorithm Based on Environment Information 
Strategy 4.5: we consider executing the Knapsack Algorithm based on feedback 
information from network traffic and IDS state information. The “heart beat” function 
will keep monitoring these environment information and trigger the execution of 
Knapsack Algorithm when prescribed conditions are satisfied. We will use the 
information of )(ΡT , maxD , queueP  (occupation percentage of the internal queue of IDS) 
and rulesP  (percentage of rules in rule portfolio that is active at the checking time point). 
The “heart beat” function will follow the steps in Table 4.4 to decide whether to 
execute the Knapsack Algorithm or not. Here uplimitQ , lowlimitQ  and thresholdR  are user 
defined parameters that can be adjusted according to the performance of IDS. 
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Table 4.4: Execute Knapsack Algorithm based on Environment Information 
 
There are five scenarios we have tested for this strategy. uplimitQ  is set to 80%, 70%, 
60%, 0% and 0% in Scenario 1 to 5, respectively. Scenario 1 – 4 use traffic mode B. 
Scenario 5 uses traffic mode C. lowlimitQ  is set to 5%, while thresholdR  is set to 95%. 
Figure 4.5 (a) – (e) show the simulation results of scenario 1 – 5, respectively. We can 
see that there is no packet loss when  uplimitQ  is 60% and 0%. Moreover, the packet loss 
disappears very quickly when uplimitQ  decreases in Figure 4.5 (a) – (d). 
 
(a) Scenario 1, traffic mode B, uplimit=80% 
If ( max)( DPT ≥  and uplimitqueue QP ≥  ) 
execute Knapsack Algorithm 
else if (  max)( DPT <  and lowlimitqueue QP <  and thresholdrules RP <  ) 
execute Knapsack Algorithm 




(b) Scenario 2, traffic mode B, uplimit=70% 
 
(c) Scenario 3, traffic mode B, uplimit=60% 




(d) Scenario 4, traffic mode B, uplimit=0% 
 
(e) Scenario 5, traffic mode C, uplimit=0% 
Figure 4.5: Knapsack Execution based on Environment Information 
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4.3 Data Analysis 
4.3.1 Comparison of Different Strategies 
Table 4.5 listed the main statistical information of different simulations in Section 4.2. 
To make a clear comparison, we combine the simulations that use the same traffic 
mode together. No packet drop is the first and most important target for the Adaptive 
IDS. Network administrators need to make sure that all the packets entering local 
network are being examined by the Intrusion Detection System. On the basis of this, 
the higher value of coverageP , the better strategy, when using the same traffic mode. The 
number of Knapsack Algorithm execution is less important when there is no packet 
loss.  
 
For traffic mode A, strategy 4.2 is no doubt the best one among listed simulations: no 
packet drop, highest coverageP  and very few execution of Knapsack Algorithms. I 
believe that this excellent performance is because of the specific traffic mode. We can 
notice that the same strategy is not doing well under traffic mode C. Simulation in 
entry 4 is also without packet loss. But, the corresponding coverageP  and number of KS 
execution are far beyond satisfaction. 
 
For traffic mode B, we see that strategy 4.2 is not the best one. Simulation in entry 14 
has a higher coverageP . Although the number of Knapsack execution is very high, it is 
still acceptable since there is no packet loss. Strategy 4.5 uses feed back information 
not only from the network traffic, but also from the IDS state to decide when to adjust 
the rule portfolio. That is why it performs better than strategy 4.2. 




Table 4.5: Comparison of Different Strategies 
No. Strategy Traffic Mode 
Packets 
Drop coverage
P (%) Number of KS 
executed 
1 4.1 A 2053 100 0 
2 4.2 A 0 94.69 3 
3 4.3, sec1=interval  A 145 80.85 29 
4 4.3, sec5.0=interval  A 0 85.95 59 
5 4.2 B 0 90.89 6 
6 4.3, sec5.0=interval  B 1525 86.14 59 
7 4.4, 200=P  B 375 87.12 73 
8 4.4, 180=P  B 203 89.15 80 
9 4.4, 160=P  B 146 90.08 87 
10 4.4, 140=P  B 0 90.66 99 
11 4.5, %80=uplimitQ  B 435 89.37 79 
12 4.5, %70=uplimitQ  B 390 89.86 82 
13 4.5, %60=uplimitQ  B 0 90.66 81 
14 4.5, %0=uplimitQ  B 0 93.90 181 
15 4.2 C 0 85.46 3 
16 4.5, %0=uplimitQ  C 0 97.68 41 
 
We can notice the 4 scenarios of strategy 4.4. As the value of P  decreases, the number 
of packet loss decreases, coverageP  increases and number of Knapsack Algorithm 
execution increases. In short, strategy 4.4 improves the IDS performance by executing 
Knapsack Algorithm more frequently. This is overall not a healthy method, since 
running Knapsack Algorithm will also use some system resources, though the 
overhead is very small (Lee et al, 2002a). For strategy 4.5, such trend is not as clear as 
strategy 4.4. This is because when we change the value of uplimitQ , only the value 
beyond a certain threshold will eliminate packet loss. This threshold is actually the 
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queue occupation percentage which guarantees no packet loss at next “heart beat” 
function checking when high traffic volume comes. 
 
For traffic C, coverageP  of strategy 4.5 is more than that of strategy 4.2 for over 10%. 
Considering the comparison we made for traffic B, we believe that referring to more 
environmental information to make defensive decision is definitely better than 
referring only to single information source, such as the incoming traffic rate. Here, 
strategy 4.5 can theoretically detect more intrusions between two traffic bursts than 
strategy 4.2. Some hackers may utilize this vulnerability of strategy 4.2, which is the 
strategy used by Cabrera et al and Lee et al, to first launch a short time traffic burst, 
then, after the  coverageP  of IDS becomes small, launch attack that involves very few 
packets. If IDS rule that is used to detect this attack has been dropped, the intrusion 
packet will be regarded as “clean” and enter the network without triggering any alarm. 
Since this procedure may happen in very short period of time, e.g. 30 seconds in 
Figure 4.5(e). It is quite difficult for network administrators to response manually in 
time. We strongly recommend the defensive strategy of 4.5, which takes different 
environmental information as feedback to decide the Knapsack Algorithm execution. 
 
4.3.2 Periodical Packet Loss 
We may notice the periodical packet loss in the simulation, for example Figure 4.3(a). 
To explain this phenomenon, we need to look deep into the IDS when the simulation is 
undergoing. Table 4.6 listed the IDS information during simulation process. 
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Table 4.6: IDS Information for Strategy 4.3, Scenario 1 
Simulation 
Time 
Total No. of 
Rules Used 




Total No. of 
Packets in 
Queue 
Number of KS 
Algorithm 
Executed 
3.0 422 0 0 3 
4.0 422 0 1 4 
5.0 422 0 0 5 
6.0 161 84 100 6 
7.0 422 0 1 7 
8.0 128 84 99 8 
9.0 422 0 0 9 
10.0 156 77 99 10 
11.0 422 0 0 11 
12.0 157 75 99 12 
13.0 422 0 0 13 
14.0 176 85 99 14 
 
We can see that when overload attack launches, say the 5th second, the rule portfolio is 
“full”, max)( DT >Ρ  happens and the packets start to accumulate in the queue. After 1 
second time, at the 6th second, the packets belonging to attack event become dominant 
in queue and the total number of packets reach the queue’s capacity limit, which is 100 
packets. Packets start to drop. When Knapsack Algorithm executes at this time, 
depending on Equation (2.8), the “weight” of attack event will increase a lot, causing 
the algorithm to cut most of the rules belonging to the attack event. As a result of this, 
the number of rules in rule portfolio becomes small, max)( DT <Ρ . The packets in 
queue, especially the packets belonging to attack event, will be processed at a very 
quick time. Then, there will be no packets drop soon. When next Knapsack Algorithm 
runs, 1 second later, the 7th second, the queue is almost empty. Although the traffic 
volume is still high at that time, which means the capacity of “knapsack” is similar as 
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1 second before, the value of im , in Equation (2.8), is very small. So, the 
corresponding “weight” of rules for attack event becomes very light, making these 
rules possible to be re-selected into the rule portfolio. Thus the rule portfolio becomes 
large again, causing packets dropping reappears. The above process happens 
periodically as Knapsack Algorithm executed every 1 second, so as the periodical 




Conclusion and Future Works 
5.1 Conclusion 
In this thesis, we implement a new method to test defensive strategies of Real Time 
Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems (RT-IDS) without building a real network 
test-bed. Different defensive strategies have been conducted to test the survivability of 
RT-IDS under the condition of overload attack. Their performances have been 
compared and the inside mechanisms of these strategies have been analyzed and 
commented. We find out that referring to more feedback information as the basis for 
making defensive decisions is definitely better than referring to single information 
source. 
 
Based on the nature of the survivability of RT-IDS, a test-bed running through virtual 
time system is suggested and built in NS2. It can be easily configured to generate 
arbitrary network background traffic, and can implement different defensive strategies 
of RT-IDS, making the RT-IDS researchers convenient to test the performance of these 
strategies locally on a single system. The key thought is to hold the packet being 
processed the amount of time that is used for inspection by current rule portfolio and 
the execution of Knapsack Algorithm. We have got similar result as previous research 
work under same scenario, validating the credibility of our test-bed. 




Different defensive strategies and various scenarios have been proposed and tested for 
Adaptive IDS. We understand deeply the inside mechanism and correlation of different 
factors of Intrusion Detection System by analyzing the internal state of IDS during the 
process of simulation. We also find that the performances of defensive strategies vary 
greatly under different network traffic scenarios, making it necessary to use a adaptive 
strategy that perform stably in the fast changing network conditions. 
 
We found that the strategy proposed by Cabrera et al (2002) and Lee et al (2002a) has 
big disadvantage that is tend to be utilized by malicious internet intruders to evade the 
inspection of IDS. It becomes vulnerable to a deliberately designed intrusion scenario 
under special network traffic condition. We have proposed a new strategy that 
performs better than the old one. It is more adaptive to the network conditions. 
Moreover, it uses feedback information not only from network traffic, but also from 
the internal state of IDS. We believe that this experience can be referred to enhance the 
survivability of RT-IDS. 
 
 
5.2 Future Works 
The test-bed we built can be further developed, for example, it can be added more 
functionality like actual rule inspection. We can consider moving the Snort rules into 
our test-bed so that we can test the rule itself. The content of network background 
traffic can be filled with the content of real traffic archive. Or, we can directly send the 
packets from real network traffic files. 




There are still many different defensive strategies available. We can continue testing 
the performance of different strategies to find out better ones. We can also consider 
enhancing the survivability of RT-IDS from an intruder point of view to design 
different network traffic conditions for testing. We believe that there are many other 
kinds of feedback information that we can utilize to construct a better defensive 
strategy. A model that can theoretically state the relationship among the decision of 
rule-dropping, the network condition, the internal state of RT-IDS and the time to 
adjust rule portfolio will be a splendid achievement in this area. 
 
Finally, building a real network test-bed to further validate the result of our test is 
useful. The software test-bed can be quickly configured and used for testing. Thus the 
researchers can use the software test-bed to eliminate those strategies that are not so 
good within a relatively short period of time. Then, we can continue testing those good 
strategies in a real test-bed to make practical effect. 
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